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Abstract: This paper critically examines a recently developed proposal for a border control 
system called iBorderCtrl, designed to detect deception based on facial recognition technology 
and the measurement of micro-expressions, termed ‘biomarkers of deceit’. Funded under the 
European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme, we situate our analysis in the wider political 
economy of ‘emotional AI’ and the history of deception detection technologies. We then move 
on to interrogate the design of iBorderCtrl using publicly available documents and assess the 
assumptions and scientific validation underpinning the project design. Finally, drawing on a 
Bayesian analysis we outline statistical fallacies in the foundational premise of mass screening 
and argue that it is very unlikely that the model that iBorderCtrl provides for deception detection
would work in practice. By interrogating actual systems in this way, we argue that we can begin 
to question the very premise of the development of data-driven systems, and emotional AI and 
deception detection in particular, pushing back on the assumption that these systems are fulfilling 
the tasks they claim to be attending to and instead ask what function such projects carry out in 
the creation of subjects and management of populations. This function is not merely technical 
but, rather, we argue, distinctly political and forms part of a mode of governance increasingly 
shaping life opportunities and fundamental rights.  
Keywords: smart borders; migration; machine learning; deception detection; lie detection; 
affective computing 
Introduction 
As data-centric technologies come to shape more and more of social life, the areas of borders 
and migration management have become prominent as sites of experimentation and 
investment. Characterised in part by a post-9/11 securitisation logic, the so-called refugee 
‘crisis’ of 2015 has heightened focus on border politics, not least in Europe where the 
simultaneous externalisation and internalisation of borders continue to shape the geopolitics of 
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the European project. The European Commission has set aside a proposed €34.9 billion for 
border control and migration management between 2021 and 2027 (Gallagher & Jona, 2019). 
The generation and collection of data plays a pertinent role in this context, with vast 
interoperable databases, digital registration processes, biometric data collection, social media 
identity verification, and various forms of data-driven risk and vulnerability assessments now 
a key part of European border regimes (Metcalfe & Dencik, 2019). Information systems such 
as VIS, SIS, and EURODAC operate to control the border crossing traffic, migration and 
asylum applications and electronic passports, facial recognition technologies and other 
biometric information make up the advent of so-called ‘smart borders’ that have become the 
hallmarks of EU-funded research and development projects in recent years (Cannataci, 2016).  
These ‘smart borders’ not only serve new forms of identification and categorisation of people 
on the move. Increasingly, we are also seeing the (re)emergence of recognition technologies 
used for detecting emotion, affective states (such as stress) and deception as part of a growing 
risk assessment industry organised around a logic of data accumulation. In 2011, the UK 
Border Agency deployed an operational trial to evaluate stress, anxiety and deception at the 
immigration desk based on a facial and thermal analysis tool developed by researchers together 
with defence technology company QinetiQ and funded by the UK Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) (POST, 2011; Ugail et al., 2007). AVATAR, another 
automated lie detector based on eye-tracking, has been tested on the southern US border (F. 
Nunamaker et al., 2013) and in 2012, the same team that commercialized AVATAR performed 
field experiments with EU border guards from several countries to test an early version of the 
lie detector (Elkins et al., 2012).   
Whilst little is known about the outcomes of these pilot programmes, investment in border 
control technologies said to identify deception and risk has continued. Recent attention has 
particularly focused on the controversial EU Horizon 2020-funded project iBorderCtrl 
(Intelligent Portable Control System), which describes its aims as deploying ‘well established 
as well as novel technologies together to collect data that will move beyond biometrics and 
onto biomarkers of deceit’ piloted at European borders (iBorderCtrl, 2016a). Dismissed as 
‘pseudo-science’ (Boffey, 2018) and subject to considerable counter-research and activism (see 
for example the initiative iBorderCtrl.no), the iBorderCtrl project is a significant case study 
for engaging with the politics of data-driven technologies. In particular, it highlights the 
relevance of a booming industry in ‘empathic media’ and ‘emotional AI’ (McStay, 2018) as it 
becomes intertwined with highly securitised policy agendas pursued in a context of perceived 
crisis.  
In this article, we build on research into deception detection and risk assessments in order to 
comprehensively illustrate the politics of both design and execution of the iBorderCtrl project. 
We start by situating the iBorderCtrl project in the context of data-driven governance and the
growth of recognition technologies in the digital economy, before moving on to outlining the 
field of deception detection and its current incarnation in an age of machine learning (ML) as 
the most popular technique to build artificial intelligence (AI) systems. This forms the 
backdrop to our analysis of the iBorderCtrl project and the technopolitical assumptions that 
underpin it. We draw on publicly available documentation in order to provide a statistical 
evaluation of how the method used in the iBorderCtrl project would work in practice. In 
particular, we outline the central limitation of applying test design based on data points from a 
control group to the general population. This statistical limitation in mass screenings is a feature 
(rather than a bug) of the performance of recognition technologies, that has significant 
implications for the rights of people, especially marginalised groups and vulnerable 
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populations that are often least able to challenge such systems. In arguing this, we make the 
case for understanding the pursuit of ‘smart borders’ and the nature of the technologies that 
make up the current European border regime as distinctly political processes that need to be 
engaged with as part of a particular mode of governance.  
The political economy of iBorderCtrl 
The advent of deception technologies has a long history, but has gained prominence in recent 
years in conjunction with the growth of ‘empathic media’, particularly in the form of 
‘emotional AI’ that involves, according to McStay (2018), ‘reading words and images, seeing 
and sensing facial expressions, gaze direction, gestures and voice. It also encompasses 
machines feeling our heart rate, body temperature, respiration and the electrical properties of 
our skin, among other bodily behaviours.’ The term ‘emotional AI’ is closely related to the 
classic field of ‘affective computing’ and is increasingly used by industry. It is a way of 
engaging with emotion as something that can be observed through means of what can be 
surveyed, measured and remembered (rather than any ‘mentalistic’ process) that works well 
with sensing techniques that classify facial and bodily behaviour. In particular, these are 
sensing techniques that have gained prominence in a context of datafication that refers to the 
trend of turning increasing aspects of social phenomena and human behaviour into quantified 
formats that can be tabulated and analysed (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). Whilst much 
of this datafication initially focused on metadata based on communication and online activities, 
it increasingly extends to sensors and facial recognition software that generates data based on 
movements, expressions and physiology, significantly blurring the contours of public and 
private experiences, and amplifying the embodied construction of data subjects.  
The use of such technologies is rapidly becoming a feature of commercial services, including 
digital platforms and devices associated with the Internet of Things, as well as in the workplace 
(Sánchez-Monedero & Dencik, 2019). States and governments, often in partnership with 
industry, have propelled the trend further, turning to data-driven recognition and detection 
technologies to enact governance. In Europe, the deployment of facial recognition technologies 
by police has sparked significant debate on citizen rights in public spaces, furthered by a 
growing discourse on “smart cities” (see for example the Face Off campaign from Big Brother 
Watch). Education is another area where facial recognition tools are being experimented with 
(McStay, 2019), drawing on developments in China where these are used, amongst other 
things, to assess attention levels amongst school pupils (Connor, 2018). Yet it is perhaps no 
surprise that it is particularly in border control, and migration management more broadly, 
where European states have sought to increase investment in technological tools at significant 
speed.  
The socio-technical assemblage that now makes up border regimes, what Pötzsch (2015) aptly 
refers to as the advent of the “iBorder” as a way to articulate the dispersal of the border into 
remote, algorithmic decisions capable of determining risks, serves as an important setting for 
the development of iBorderCtrl. Proposed by researchers at Manchester Metropolitan 
University in the UK, the iBorderCtrl project has been supported by a €4.5 million research 
grant under the Horizon2020 programme at the European Research Council. It continues a 
long-standing history of EU-funded security technology, not least in the context of border 
control and migration management, that has gained further prominence with the growing 
enthusiasm for the potentials of ML and AI. Significantly, there have been concerns about a 
lack of transparency surrounding the processes and details of the iBorderCtrl project, including 
ethics questions and the relationship between the research team and private companies on the 
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project (Wilde 2018; Gallagher and Jona 2019).  
The iBorderCtrl project centres on the ability to perform automatic “deception detection” and 
“risk assessment” in the border-crossing encounter. The project proposes a two-stage process 
with a pre-registration step to provide traveller information, and a later border crossing stage 
that includes biometric identification and matching, document authenticity analysis, interaction 
with external legacy and social systems, an Automatic Deception Detection System (ADDS), 
a Risk Based Assessment Tool (RBAT) and a post hoc analytics tool (iBorderCtrl, 2016b). The 
aim of the project is to speed up border control for third-country nationals crossing land borders 
of EU Member states by providing a decision support system for border authorities 
(iBorderCtrl, 2016c). The project includes pilot tests in Hungarian, Greek and Latvian land 
borders.  
The features of iBorderCtrl are typical in smart border systems, but the project is novel in its 
application of the ADDS. In seeking to ‘move beyond biometrics and onto biomarkers of 
deceit.’, the project claims to build proxy features that represent, according to the authors, the 
act of ‘deceiving’ that will inform the categorization of persons as ‘bona fide’ and ‘non-bona 
fide’ travellers (iBorderCtrl, 2016b). As we will go on to detail further below, in epitomising 
not only the ideology of ‘dataism’ (Van Dijck, 2014) in its assumptions about the relationship 
between people and data, but also the simultaneous scientific void of affective recognition 
systems (Wilde, 2018) and ‘erasure of doubt’ in machine learning algorithms (Amoore, 2019), 
iBorderCtrl emerges as a paragon for the politics of data-driven governance. As a way to 
illustrate this, we start by situating our analysis of iBorderCtrl in a broader discussion of lie 
detection devices.  
Deception detection 
Lie detectors 
Deception or lie detection devices, mainly represented by the polygraph, have always been 
contentious and lacking in substantial scientific evidence (Damphousse et al., 2007; National 
Research Council, 2003; Wilde, 2014). Generally, proposals on lie detectors assume that, 
during an interview, deceptive answers will produce unique cues such as physiological 
responses, facial expressions, pitch changes amongst others (DePaulo et al., 2003) that can be 
accurately measured. A second important assumption shared by many studies and proposals is 
that lying is a valid predictor of guilt (Rajoub & Zwiggelaar, 2014). 
Although scientific consensus is that the accuracy of the polygraph and other devices is close 
to chance when rigorous experimental criteria are met (Saxe & Ben-Shakhar, 1999), industry 
proponents of the polygraph claim that deceptive answers produce physiological responses that 
can be detected by monitoring blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and/or skin conductivity 
(Wilde 2014). A review from the US National Research Council (NRC) (2003) concluded that 
the polygraph, even if it worked as its vendors claim, would not be useful to perform population 
screenings with low rates of events in the population since it would produce a large number of 
false positives (we elaborate on this below). In addition, the study warns that the indicators 
these tests rely on can be gamed through cognitive or physical means. What is more, in a meta-
analysis of 158 cues associated with deception, including nonverbal cues, DePaulo et al. 
(2003), concluded that the majority of cues are unreliable. Nevertheless, the use of lie detectors 
is relatively widespread in some US sectors such as insurance, although in most parts of the 
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world it is not recognized as a valid test (cf. Wilde, 2014).  
Beyond the polygraph, there have been other devices based on Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) (Simpson, 2008), eye-tracking (F. Nunamaker et al., 2013), 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Heussen et al., 2010), voice analysis (NITV Federal Services, 
2019) or thermal facial analysis (Rajoub & Zwiggelaar, 2014) among others. Many of these 
methods have been scrutinized by third parties who tend to disagree with the reported accuracy 
from developers of the devices and conclude that the experimental validations were generally 
weak. Often the number of participants for testing the tool is far too low to make any robust 
claims about its accuracy (Heussen et al., 2010). With regards to voice analysis, the NRC in 
the US concluded that the studies validating voice stress analysis (VSA) as a means of lie 
detection ‘offer little or no scientific basis for the use of the computer voice stress analyser or 
similar voice measurement instruments’ (NRC, 2003). Later work by linguistic scholars 
Eriksson and Lacerda (2008) studied the feasibility of computer-based VSA (CVSA) and 
concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support the manufacturers’ claims. Rigorous 
experimental studies found that the detection accuracy was worse than chance level: CVSA 
correctly identified only 15% of deceptive subjects on average (Damphousse et al., 2007). The 
product analysed by Eriksson and Lacerda (2008) was tested in the UK Department for Work 
and Pensions over three years. In 2011 the department concluded the detector was not useful 
after spending £2.4 million (Lomas, 2010).  
Data-driven deception detection 
Deception detection started a new era with the popularization of ML for assessment of 
psychometrics (Burr & Cristianini, 2019). Rather than performing an analysis of signals of the 
polygraph by trained experts, systems in this vein tend to rely on different types of data to fit 
statistical models to perform the classification task. The variety of systems typically extract 
features from raw data, such as video or other types of sensors, that represents a time window 
of the moment a person answers a question, and then label these vectors of features as deceptive 
or truthful. ML methods fit a model to the training dataset to map the multidimensional feature 
space to the output label space (deception or no-deception labels). The features can be 
engineered based on previous research, e.g. a feature that measures the blinking of each eye, 
or they can be learned by the model as part of the overall fitting process, as deep learning and 
autoencoders do. 
ML is the ideal tool to create such mappings since many models such as artificial neural 
networks are universal approximators, meaning they can learn/build/fit any function to relate 
the input space with the label space provided the model is complex enough (Cybenko, 1989). 
Recent work has demonstrated that (deep) neural networks are also able to learn random 
labelling of data by memorizing the whole training set (C. Zhang et al., 2016). As we will 
elaborate on in our analysis of iBorderCtrl, since ML can build models that correlate any-input 
to any-output, data science practitioners have to be particularly careful to avoid issues such as 
overfitting, the representativeness of the sample, the reductionism of the optimization process 
or the misalignment of the ML optimization task with the domain optimization task (Lipton, 
2018).  
Considering the capacity of ML methods to fit models in complex datasets, deception detection 
relies heavily on the quality of such data sets. The quality of datasets in applied ML refers to 
how close the test environment is with the deployment scenario, but is also related to rules of 
robustness in statistical learning such as the number of patterns to comply with the Central 
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Limit Theorem, the number of patterns in relation to the number of features (see the “curse of 
dimensionality” discussion below), the stratification of the sample, the assumption about 
independent and identically distributed random variables (i.i.d.),  etc.  All these factors 
determine the capacity of the system to generalize with unseen data and the conditions under 
which this can be expected and ensured.  
The case of deception detection has many of the attributes of a weak-defined task: people 
cannot universally define either the input or the labels in terms of data, the binarization of the 
problem is a hard reduction from the spectrum of emotions of a person to a binary label (i.e., 
that lying consists of a set of simulated emotions in a laboratory), and it would be complex to 
formulate a rule or set of rules to perform the input-output mapping. In addition, the modelling 
of the dependent variable is a case of inference of a latent variable, meaning it is not directly 
observable. Since ML allow for fitting any training data, but not to generalise from it unless 
conditions are met, it is particularly risky to draw conclusions about the performance of ML 
models with non-rigorous datasets and without strategies to mitigate overfitting (e.g. as done 
in current deep learning methods but is not the case with ADDS).   
The ADDS component of iBorderCtrl is based on what the authors refer to as ‘biomarkers of 
deceit’ (iBorderCtrl, 2016b). These are non-verbal facial micro-expressions that, according to 
the authors, all humans produce when lying during an answer. Those signals when combined 
are therefore said to be able to act as predictors of lying. The biomarkers of deceit are encoded 
as 38 features, or channels, such as ‘left eye blink’, ‘increase in face redness’ or head movement 
directions (O’Shea et al., 2018). Each feature is extracted from a video segment of one second 
in which a person is lying or not when answering a question (although it is not clear from the 
available documentation how they generate features for the segment). The video is captured at 
30 frames per second (fps) with a video resolution of 640x480. Each training pattern of the 
dataset consists of the vector of 38 features and the label that indicates truth or deception. The 
gender of the person is also encoded as one of the 38 features. To create the dataset, 32 
participants (actors) were assigned a “truthful” or “deceptive” role to perform during the 
interview. Each participant had to answer 13 questions (see Table 1) with each answer 
segmented in many vectors. According to the authors, this procedure generated 86,586 vectors. 
The dataset consisted of 10 participants classified as having Asian/Arabic ethnic background 
and 22 as White European background, and 22 classified as male and 10 as female. 
The interviews took place in a lab setting. The participant selection and role assignment criteria 
are not detailed in the public documentation. The “deceptive” actors produced both directed 
“truthful” and directed “false” answers. To create a directed “false” answer, all “deceptive” 
participants were given fake identities and a short life history and were instructed to pack a 
suitcase with standard items and then to introduce a prohibited item, such as a ‘simulated drug 
package’ that consists of ‘soap powder in clear packet’. 
Based on the dataset of participants, an artificial neural network (ANN) was fitted to the 
training data and the performance evaluated with patterns of people that were not used to train 
the model. Each question 𝑞 was assigned a score 𝐷𝑞 that consists of the averaged sum of the 
prediction 𝑑𝑛 of the ANN for each video segment of the question. The model has two 
parameters to filter segment scores 𝑑𝑛 in order to delete unknown facial expressions from 
calculation of 𝐷𝑞. In the task of detecting a deceptive scenario, the authors reported an accuracy 
rate of 73.66% when detecting deception and 75.55% when detecting truthfulness.  
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Assumptions, dataset and experimental validation 
Having outlined some of the background of deception detection and details of the iBorderCtrl 
model, we can begin to identify some key assumptions that extend a historically flawed area 
of research but one that despite errors and lack of evidence has persisted as a technique for 
assessing people. The desire to find a “scientific” method to detect lying, affective states and 
emotions is what drives the investment in deception detection and emotional AI more broadly. 
This desire or political will far outpaces the validity of the technology. Moreover, as we go on 
to discuss in this section, it ignores the contested assumptions upon which such technology is 
based that, as Amoore (2019) puts it, ‘generates the parameters against which uncertainty will 
be adjudicated’ such that a multiplicity of doubts in the model can be condensed to a single 
output beyond doubt (deception or truth). We base our analysis of such technopolitical 
assumptions on a number of academic papers relating to the design of iBorderCtrl as well as 
public documents available from the iBorderCtrl project website.  
The central premise of the ADDS component in the iBorderCtrtl project is that some non-EU 
travellers will lie about their identity, financial means, destination, or other aspects of their 
travel plans that concern the state of desired entry at the point of entry. The project does not 
specify the intentions of travellers when providing fake information, but the example questions 
are focused on identity confirmation, the content of luggage and information related to other 
travellers, relatives or friends (see Table 1). According to the project’s general scheme, a person 
identified as having likely given a deceptive response will be interviewed by a human border 
guard to perform further investigations.  
Table 1 Experiment interview questions from the ADDS validation from O’Shea et al. (2018).  
Question 
Number Question 
1 What is your family name? 
2 What is in your case? 
3 Have you seen any posters of prohibited items? 
4 Are there any items from the lists of prohibited items in your case? 
5 How many items are in the case? 
6 
If you open the case and show me what is inside, will it confirm that your answers 
were true? 
7 What is your first name? 
8 When were you born? 
9 Where were you born? 
10 What is your current citizenship? 
11 
Please tell me the name of a friend or family member who can confirm your 
identity? 
12 What is the relationship of this person to you? 
13 Where does this person live? 
The goal of the iBorderCtrl smart border is to detect “bona fide” and “non-bona fide” travellers 
to identify illegal border crossings. Since the target is to discover illegal activities through lie 
detection, deception is considered a valid predictor of guilt and risk. Deception is indirectly 
observed though affective proxies such as anxiety that are indirectly observed by measuring 
non-verbal micro-expressions. Therefore, there is a chain of assumptions with regards to the 
relationship between criminality, lying, affective states and facial micro-expressions in which 
the role of ML is to fit a prediction model that can differentiate between deceptive and truthful 
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responses. Based on information from public documents, it does not appear that this chain of 
assumptions is backed up with previous theoretical and empirical studies. The relation between 
deceptive behaviour and guilt and risk can be found in other pilot programs at borders: For 
example, AVATAR was tested by assigning ‘guilty or innocent condition’ to the participants 
and also notes that ‘procedures were intended to heighten anxiety and simulate the 
circumstances surrounding actual criminal conduct’ (Derrick et al., 2010). In the context of lie 
detection, the link between lie and guilt is generally direct, despite identified concerns that such 
a premise invites a sense of automatic suspicion amongst those subjected to the assessment 
(POST, 2011).  
Another base assumption is that there exist non-verbal facial (micro) gestures, labelled as 
“biomarkers of deceit”, that are indicators of deception during an interview. This assumption 
is based on the theories of Paul Ekman who claims that lying is an emotionally demanding task 
that may leave non-verbal behavioural traces (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). However, as noted 
above, reviews of studies suggest that assessment based on non-verbal behavioural observation 
is close to chance. Among several reasons, one simple explanation is that both people lying or 
telling the truth would do similar emotional work to appear honest when confronting an 
interview with consequences (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij & Granhag, 2012).  
The model is also premised on the assumption that facial non-verbal micro-gestures can be 
measured. Micro-gestures or micro-expressions are extremely quick facial expressions that last 
between 1/25s and 1/5s and have been said to be used as proxy features to recognise emotions 
(M. Zhang et al., 2014). Micro-expressions are encoded into numerical features, for instance, 
by an algorithm that extracts a feature to measure eye blinking by tracking the eyes during a 
video segment. To capture such fast events, typically 200fps (frames per second) cameras are 
used (Davison et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2014). However, in a previous project by the iBorderCtrl 
team, Silent Talker, 15 fps cameras were used to capture micro-gestures (Rothwell et al., 2006) 
whereas the ADDS uses 30fps cameras (O’Shea et al., 2018). It is not clear from available 
documentation what the limitations of using such low fps cameras are for capturing micro-
expressions.  
The term “biomarker” or “biological marker” is typically used in medicine to refer to ‘a broad 
subcategory of medical signs – that is, objective indications of medical state observed from 
outside the patient – which can be measured accurately and reproducibly’ (Strimbu & Tavel, 
2010). The team behind iBorderCtrl state that biomarkers of deceit are non-verbal signals that 
alone cannot reveal deceptive behaviour but together can be used by an ML method to detect 
lying. This means that according to this model, deceptive and non-deceptive behaviours are 
two non-overlapping categories that represent a set of emotional states. These states would be 
represented by the combination of 38 features (statistically correlated with the target).  When 
assigning a label to the video segment(s) related to an answer, the ADDS only considers that 
the emotional states of a person can be grouped as deceptive or truthful and no additional 
possibilities are allowed, although the model has two parameters to filter un-meaningful 
segments when there is not a clear category for them.  
In general, the common basis of lie detectors is that there are universal and involuntary 
physiological and physical responses that a person produces as a result of lying. In the case of 
the ADDS, it assumes that across persons, ethnicity, gender, age, functional diversity, 
neurodiversity, etc., there are universal ways of expressing deception through non-verbal 
expressions. According to the team, provided with a large and diverse enough training dataset, 
the tool might be able to detect deception amongst heterogeneous travellers (O’Shea et al., 
2018). This assumption is partially shared with methods for emotion detection, which assume 
8 
 
the existence of a universal commonality of expressions (McStay, 2018). What is more, the 
ADDS is premised on the assumption that the scenarios used for data collection and method 
validation are representative enough for real environment conditions, for example in the case 
of a ‘simulated drug package’ as noted above. Generating a suitable dataset is a common 
problem for data-driven deception detectors in which the experimental set-up consists of people 
interpreting a role. Previous projects have attempted to minimize artificiality and strengthen 
generalizability ‘by offering substantial monetary bonuses’ to participants judged by 
‘professional interviewers’ as in the case of AVATAR, and by directing the participants to 
actually commit the crime in question (Derrick et al., 2010). Other attempts have included 
asking participants to interpret roles to convince an examiner that they were honest. As an 
exception, Pérez-Rosas et al. (2015) used real situations instead of actors by gathering data 
from real trial recordings, using the verdict of the trial and the testimonies verified by police to 
label clips as deceptive or truthful. Yet, apart from problems with representativeness stemming 
from the creation of situations of ‘real’ deception, the problems with relying on particular forms 
of behaviour as indicative of lying as well as the assumed universality of modes of deception 
cues across different demographics and populations remain significant fallacies in the training 
and validation scenarios. 
Moreover, critical questions arise in relation to the way researchers attempted to validate the 
ADDS before conducting the pilot programs. The validation experiment provided by the team 
consisted of testing the performance of the ML classifier that would be included in the ADDS. 
This suggests that a test with new (unseen) individuals whose data needs to be captured, 
processed and classified by the ML model was not carried out. In this sense, there are questions 
about the actual extent of the test of the ADDS module. 
As outlined above, the experimental setup for the ADDS component of the iBorderCtrl project 
consisted of a sample of 32 participants with each person generating 38-dimensional vectors 
for each question so that the training set consists of 86,586 training patterns. The generalization 
performance was tested with a leave-one-out (LOO) experimental design that was repeated 9 
times to test the performance of the classifier in detecting deception in two unseen persons (one 
deceptive and one truthful participant). The detection rate for these 9 pairs of persons was, on 
average, 75.56% for deceptive and 73,67%  for truthful participants. The standard deviation of 
the accuracy in the experiments with unseen persons was 24,37% for deceptive and 34,29% for 
truthful participants. The team explored the performance of the ADDS for persons whose 
vectors are both in the training and test sets. In this case, the mean performance is near 95% 
for both types of participants and the standard deviation is significantly reduced to 1% and 
0.86% (see Table 2). Note that this second experiment cannot be justified from an experimental 
validation point of view. 
The validation results present high variability in the classification performance of unseen
participants. Since we do not have access to the dataset, we can only argue that the produced 
models may be overfitting because of the inherent problems of the training dataset, causing this 
instability in the predictions. The small sample size has some issues beyond the obvious lack 
of representation noted above, particularly in light of the nature of populations crossing 
European borders. From a statistical and ML point of view, the data sample needs to grow in 
relation to the number of input features (38), the number of classes (2) and the number of 
parameters in the model (unknown in this case). It can be argued that the number of data 
samples in the case of iBorderCtrl is 86,586; however, since these points are obtained from 30 
participants (one truthful and one deceptive participant are reserved for testing), it is unclear 
whether the points extracted from each person can be rich enough to represent the population 
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in the 38-dimensional feature space. The training dataset does not comply with the i.i.d. 
assumptions of most machine learning algorithms since the samples obtained from each 
participant are correlated and, thus, the generated patterns can be very close in the feature space 
and at the same time very distant to the vectors generated for other people. That is, the data in 
the feature space is very sparse, which can produce several problems. In statistics, this is known 
as the “curse of dimensionality” (COD) (Altman & Krzywinski, 2018) and it is especially 
relevant when the sample size is smaller than the number of dimensions of the data (30<38 
under our hypothesis). The COD is well known to cause problems such as overfitting and 
unstable model predictions. Even without public information to fully check our hypothesis, we 
can see some hints to support it. As a consequence, we can conclude that it is very likely that 
the ML model overfits in relation to the data points and therefore achieves a better than chance 
performance in the validation experiments.  
Table 2 Performance of the ADDS in the validation experiment. Source Table IV in p.7 in 
O’Shea et al. (2018). 
 
ADDS performance for 
unseen persons 
ADDS performance including 
the same person in the train 
and test datasets 
Fold T D T D 
1 100.00 57.00 94.30 93.69 
2 50.00 36.00 93.62 94.96 
3 50.00 100.00 94.31 95.15 
4 90.00 100.00 94.23 95.46 
5 100.00 10.00 95.50 95.41 
6 72.00 100.00 95.45 95.91 
7 100.00 100.00 95.75 96.22 
8 38.00 100.00 95.91 96.28 
9 80.00 60.00 96.67 96.45 
10 - - 96.55 96.78 
Mean Acc. 75.56 73.67 95.23 95.50 
STD Acc. 24.37 34.29 1.00 0.86 
 
These assumptions point to the contested scientific premises upon which iBorderCtrl has been 
able to position its model as a solution to a constructed problem of deception detection as a 
significant function of border control. These do not address the wider questions of the premises 
of optimisation in terms of risk estimation and speed of border crossings that are key features 
of the iBorderCtrl project (although not all detailed in the available publications); nor do they 
address the fundamental questions of the purpose of borders, the right to privacy, or the 
tendency towards discrimination against the most marginalised and vulnerable populations 
likely to experience the violence of borders.1 Discussions on assumptions outlined above need 
to be considered in the context of these broader questions, but here we focus on some of the 
technical issues as a way to  illustrate the politics of constructing problems and selling solutions 
in the context of a perceived security crisis. 
 
1 For a discussion of these issues in the context of iBortderCtrl, we refer to the resources published on 
www.iborderctrl.no 
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Statistical limits of mass screening 
In order to further elaborate on the limitations of the design of iBorderCtrl, we now turn our 
attention to assessing how the model presented in documentation would actually “work” in 
practice. Whilst our focus is specifically on the method for deception detection outlined in the 
iBorderCtrl project, we see our analysis as being relevant for models intended for mass 
screening more generally.  
When performing a test to search for rare events, such as a deception detection classifier, in 
whole statistical populations, rather than directly considering the test outcome (i.e., the 
conditional probability of having a liar given the data), it is more suitable to draw conclusions 
from the expected predictive value, also known as posterior probability in Bayesian 
terminology. This type of analysis is common in medicine (Fenton & Neil, 2010) and public 
policy decisions and it is aligned with previous work evaluating mass screening proposals 
related to security (e.g. NRC 2003, Munk 2017). That is, this is an established way to calculate 
the probability that a person is an actual liar given the test output and the frequency of the event 
in the population, which is the relevant information for the decision-maker (the border guard 
in this case).  
Bayesian statistics provide a principled method to incorporate prior knowledge in a domain, 
also named beliefs, about an event to evaluate the relationship between the observed data (test) 
and that belief. Another point of view is to separate the properties of a test or classifier from 
the characteristics of the statistical population. In this section, we will use the Bayes rule to 
interrogate the behaviour of the ADDS.  
A test can produce four outcomes, in our case:  
• True positive: the test detected deception and the person lied.  
• False positive: the test detected deception and actually the person did not lie. 
• True negative: the test does not detect deception and the person said the truth.  
• False negative: the test does not detect deception and the person lied.  
The performance of the test can be represented in the confusion matrix of conditional 
probabilities. Table 3 is built with the information provided in the documentation (O’Shea et 
al., 2018).  
Table 3 Confusion matrix of conditional probabilities of the ADDS. Source Table IV in p.7 in 
O’Shea et al. (2018). 
  Ground Truth 
  Lie No-lie 
Test Result 
Test positive 73.66% 24.45% 
Test negative 26.34% 75.55% 
The test output produces conditional probabilities given the observed data (biomarkers of 
deception). For the above table, we interpret that if a person lies there is a 73.66% chance of 
having a positive test (true positive rate or sensitivity) and a 26.34% chance of having a 
negative test (false negative rate). If the person tells the truth, there is a 24.45% chance that the 
test will be positive (false positive rate) and a 75.55% chance that the test will be negative (true 
negative rate or specificity). 
The framework of Bayesian statistics allows us to better understand the expected performance 
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by incorporating knowledge about the context of the problem in the form of prior probability. 
The prior probability, also known as prevalence, represents the frequency of the event of 
interest (liars in our case) and regulates the level of trust in the prediction of a classifier in 
particular context. We can formulate a different hypothesis of the prior P(Lie), for instance, 
5% of liars, and observe how each type of result of the test varies. For the case of 5% of liars, 
the corrected joint probabilities of each test outcome are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 Joint probability matrix of expected performance of the ADDS for a context of 5% of 
liars (prior probability of 0.05). 
  Ground Truth 
  Lie (0.05) No-lie (0.95) 
Test Result 
Test positive (True Pos.) 
0.0368 
(False Pos.) 
0.2323 
Test negative (False Neg.) 
0.0132 
(True Neg) 
0.7177 
The corrected performance is interpreted in the following way. For example, if we have 1,000 
people being interviewed with 50 liars and 950 non-liars, ~38 out of 50 liars will be detected 
at the cost of wrongly labelling ~232 innocent people as liars. Approximately, 13 liars would 
not be detected by the test and ~717 people would be correctly classified as not deceptive.  
Finally, to evaluate the expected behaviour of the deception test, Bayesian statistics help to 
answer the question provided we have a positive test, what is the probability the person is 
lying?, that formally corresponds to the posterior probability, also known as positive predictive 
value (PPV). We can calculate the posterior by using the Bayes Theorem: 𝑃( Lie ∣ + ) = 𝑃( + ∣ Lie )𝑃(Lie)𝑃(+)  = 
= 𝑃( + ∣ Lie )𝑃(Lie)𝑃( + ∣ Lie )𝑃(Lie) + 𝑃( + ∣ Non-lie )𝑃(Non-lie) 
where: 
• 𝑃( Lie ∣ + ) is the probability of having a liar (Lie) given a positive test (+), this is the 
posterior probability. 
• P( + ∣ Lie ) is the chance of having a positive test (+) when the person is lying (Lie). 
This is the probability of true positive (73.66%). 
• P(Lie) is the probability of having a person that would lie in the interview, formally 
prior probability but often referred to as frequency or prevalence. It is a characteristic 
of the population, not of the deception test.  
• P(Non − lie) is the probability of having a person that is telling the truth (P(Non-
lie)=1-P(Lie)). 
• P( + ∣ Non-lie ) is the probability of having a positive test (+) when the person is not 
lying (Non − lie). This is a false positive (24.45%).  
Therefore, we can calculate the posterior with the hypothesis of 5% of liars in the population 
that will be screened: 𝑃( Liar ∣ + ) = 0.7366 × 0.050.7366 × 0.05 + 0.2445 × 0.95 ≈ 13.69% 
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This means that, in a scenario of 5% of liars, 13.69% of positive tests will correspond to actual 
liars crossing the borders and 86.31% will correspond to false positives, meaning only 1 
positive in 8 persons labelled as a liar would correspond to an actual liar. Regarding false 
discoveries, the negative predictive value (NPV) or posterior of negative tests, 𝑃( Non-lie ∣ - ), 
gives the probability of having actual truth-tellers when the deception test is negative. In the 
same scenario, the NPV is 98.20%, so most of the interviews with negative results correspond 
to people that did not lie. Figure 1 shows a graphic example of the decision tree of events 
relating to the corrected outcomes of the test and the posterior probabilities.  
 
Figure 1 Event tree to explain deception detection probability of each outcome. In this case we 
test the hypothesis of 1% of liars in the population 
 
Figure 2 Posterior probabilities of a positive and negative test for different scenarios of the 
frequency of deception. Highlighted values correspond to the scenario of 5% of liars. While 
the conditional probability is fixed, the probability of someone being a liar after a positive test 
depends on the general population. 
To highlight how the deception detection test would behave with different ratios of liars (prior 
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probability), Figure 2 shows how the PPV and NPV vary under different hypotheses. Although 
it is not clear in the public documentation about iBorderCtrl how frequent it is believed that 
deception is during border-crossings, from Figure 2, we can know that if there is one liar or 
criminal in 10,000 people, the PPV would be 0.03%, if there is one in 1,000 the PPV would be 
0.3% and 13.69% for the case of 5 in 100 people. It is straightforward to check that the smallest 
prior that produces a posterior of 50% would be the case of 1 criminal in every 4 persons.  
As such, what this discussion highlights is that when transferred to a real-world context, even 
in the case that all the assumptions we identified in the previous section hold, the ADDS test 
will fail to identify many of the imposters while it simultaneously will flag many “bona fide” 
travellers as “liars”. That is, even in the most favourable case for iBorderCtrl it is very unlikely 
that the tool can work in practice. This raises fundamental questions about the societal 
implications of such a system and who will be most impacted.  
Conclusion  
The turn to data-driven systems has taken hold of large swathes of state activity, often advanced 
by its own inherent logic of data accumulation as a recourse to better and more efficient forms 
of governance. Funding agendas and resource allocation is mimicking this logic, advancing 
projects that have sought to capitalise on the political economy of digital infrastructures and 
the increased securitisation of policy. The iBorderCtrl project epitomises the current moment 
of data politics in terms of its constitution, design and execution. Initiated in 2016 under the 
European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme, the project exemplifies the race to AI, the 
growing industry around biometrics and emotion detection for the purposes of population 
management, underpinned by a perceived political crisis that has strengthened the rhetoric of 
border regimes. By interrogating the actual mechanisms by which the iBorderCtrl project is 
said to function, we therefore want to draw attention to the wider politics of the development 
and deployment of such technologies. This is particularly pertinent as the “super-charged 
bureaucracy” (McQuillan, 2019) advanced by AI is part of (re)shaping the conditions of social, 
economic, and political injustice that are overwhelmingly burdened by the already 
marginalised (Benjamin, 2019; Browne, 2015). As McQuillan puts it, the inherent right to 
move and live is not a right if the person has to win it by confronting AI.  
We have shown this by outlining the techno-politics of the iBorderCtrl project and the 
extension of deeply contested assumptions about the relationship between deception and guilt, 
and the way these can be recognised as physiological states that can be measured as facial 
micro-expressions. We have also questioned the design of the experiment that underpins its 
scientific validation and noted the insufficiency of the sample size of the training data-set used, 
arguing that the public documentation available provides no indication that the model achieves 
the performance the developers indicate.   
Moreover, even if the model did work as reported, we have highlighted how mass use of 
deception detection, to be piloted on general populations, is statistically different than targeted 
use, pointing to the relevance of the rate of false positives in this context. Our analysis 
demonstrates that the foundational premise of mass screening lacks statistical soundness. This 
undermines the workings of the iBorderCtrl design in practice. The high-level technopolitical 
task of detecting irregular border crossings is at best a weak surrogate of the actual machine 
learning task, that, even in the case of supporting the chain of assumptions in the design, is to 
reduce a set of facial expressions to a label of deceptive or truthful behaviour when answering 
a question. This becomes only more startling when we begin to consider the level of complexity 
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of the situations and backgrounds of populations at border-crossings.
By interrogating actual systems in this way, we can begin to question the very premise of their 
development, moving away from the notion that these systems are fulfilling the tasks they claim 
to be attending to, and instead ask what function such projects carry out in the creation of 
subjects and management of populations. This function is not merely technical, but rather, as 
we have argued, distinctly political, and forms part of a mode of governance increasingly 
shaping life opportunities and fundamental rights.  
Acknowledgments 
Research for this article is part of a large multi-year project called ‘Data Justice: Understanding 
datafication in relation to social justice’ (DATAJUSTICE) funded by an ERC Starting Grant 
(no. 759903). We are grateful to Vera Wilde, Andrew McStay and Nello Cristianini for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
References 
Altman, N., & Krzywinski, M. (2018, May 31). The curse(s) of dimensionality. Nature 
Methods. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41592-018-0019-x 
Amoore, L. (2019). Doubt and the Algorithm: On the Partial Accounts of Machine Learning. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 36(6), 147–169. 
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. Polity 
Press. 
Boffey, D. (2018, November 2). EU border ‘lie detector’ system criticised as pseudoscience. 
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/eu-border-lie-
detection-system-criticised-as-pseudoscience 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of Deception Judgments. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 
Browne, S. (2015). Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness. Duke University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822375302 
Burr, C., & Cristianini, N. (2019). Can Machines Read our Minds? Minds and Machines. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-019-09497-4 
Cannataci, J. (2016, February 24). Final Report Summary—SMART (Scalable Measures for 
Automated Recognition Technologies). FP7 | CORDIS | European Commission. 
https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99234/reporting/en 
Connor, N. (2018, May 17). Chinese school uses facial recognition to monitor student attention 
in class. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/17/chinese-
school-uses-facial-recognition-monitor-student-attention/ 
Cybenko, G. (1989). Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function. Mathematics 
of Control, Signals and Systems, 2(4), 303–314. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02551274 
Damphousse, K. R., Pointon, L., Upchurch, D., & Moore, R. K. (2007). Assessing the Validity 
of Voice Stress Analysis Tools in a Jail Setting (No. 219031) [Data set]. U.S. 
Department of Justice. https://doi.org/10.1037/e664702007-001 
Davison, A. K., Lansley, C., Costen, N., Tan, K., & Yap, M. H. (2018). SAMM: A Spontaneous 
Micro-Facial Movement Dataset. IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, 9(1), 
116–129. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAFFC.2016.2573832 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. 
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. 
15 
 
Derrick, D. C., Elkins, A. C., Burgoon, J. K., Nunamaker, J. F., & Zeng, D. D. (2010). Border 
Security Credibility Assessments via Heterogeneous Sensor Fusion. IEEE Intelligent 
Systems, 25(3), 41–49. https://doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2010.79 
Ekman, P., & Rosenberg, E. L. (2005). What the Face Reveals: Basic and Applied Studies of 
Spontaneous Expression Using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) (Second 
Edition). Oxford University Press. 
Elkins, A. C., Derrick, D. C., & Gariup, M. (2012). The Voice and Eye Gaze Behavior of an 
Imposter: Automated Interviewing and Detection for Rapid Screening at the Border. 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Computational Approaches to Deception Detection, 
49–54. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2388616.2388624 
Eriksson, A., & Lacerda, F. (2008). Charlatanry in forensic speech science: A problem to be 
taken seriously. International Journal of Speech Language and the Law, 14(2), 169–
193. https://doi.org/10.1558/ijsll.2007.14.2.169 
F. Nunamaker, J., Golob, E., Derrick, D. C., Elkins, A. C., & Twyman, N. W. (2013). Field 
Tests of an AVATAR Interviewing System for Trusted Traveler Applicants. The 
University of Arizona (Tucson, Arizona). 
http://www.borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/FieldTestsofanAVATARInterv
iewingSystemforTrustedTravelerApplicants.pdf 
Fenton, N., & Neil, M. (2010). Comparing risks of alternative medical diagnosis using 
Bayesian arguments. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 43(4), 485–495. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2010.02.004 
Gallagher, R., & Jona, L. (2019, July 26). We Tested Europe’s New Lie Detector for
Travelers—And Immediately Triggered a False Positive. The Intercept. 
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/26/europe-border-control-ai-lie-detector/ 
Heussen, Y., Binkofski, F., & Jolij, J. (2010). The semantics of the lying face—An EEG study. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 77(3), 206. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2010.06.006 
iBorderCtrl. (2016a). IBorderCtrl. https://www.iborderctrl.eu/ 
iBorderCtrl. (2016b). Technical Framework. IBorderCtrl. https://perma.cc/9MKY-GAFC 
iBorderCtrl. (2016c). The project. IBorderCtrl. https://perma.cc/L7KM-TPFK 
Lipton, Z. C. (2018, July 17). The Mythos of Model Interpretability—ACM Queue. Acmqueue, 
16(3). https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3241340 
Lomas, N. (2010, November 11). DWP kills funding for benefit fraud-finding tech. ZDNet. 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/dwp-kills-funding-for-benefit-fraud-finding-tech/ 
Mayer-Schönberger, V., & Cukier, K. (2013). Big data: The essential guide to work, life and 
learning in the age of insight. Hachette UK. 
McQuillan, D. (2019, June 7). AI Realism and structural alternatives. Danmcquillan.Io. 
./ai_realism.html 
McStay, A. (2018). Emotional AI: The rise of empathic media. Sage. 
McStay, A. (2019). Emotional AI and EdTech: Serving the public good? Learning, Media and 
Technology, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439884.2020.1686016 
Metcalfe, P., & Dencik, L. (2019). The politics of big borders: Data (in)justice and the 
governance of refugees. First Monday, 24(4). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i4.9934 
National Research Council. (2003). The Polygraph and Lie Detection. The National Academies 
Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10420 
NITV Federal Services. (2019). Expert Voice Stress Analysis Software & Lie Detector Test. 
NITV Federal Services | The Manufacturer of the ‘Computer Voice Stress Analyzer’ - 
CVSA. https://www.cvsa1.com/ 
O’Shea, J., Crockett, K., Khan, W., Kindynis, P., Antoniades, A., & Boultadakis, G. (2018). 
Intelligent Deception Detection through Machine Based Interviewing. 2018 
16 
 
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/IJCNN.2018.8489392 
Pérez-Rosas, V., Abouelenien, M., Mihalcea, R., & Burzo, M. (2015). Deception Detection 
using Real-life Trial Data. Proceedings of the 2015 ACM on International Conference 
on Multimodal Interaction - ICMI ’15, 59–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2818346.2820758 
POST. (2011). Detecting deception (POST-PN-375). Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology. 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POST-PN-375 
Pötzsch, H. (2015). The Emergence of iBorder: Bordering Bodies, Networks, and Machines. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(1), 101–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/d14050p 
Rajoub, B. A., & Zwiggelaar, R. (2014). Thermal Facial Analysis for Deception Detection. 
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 9(6), 1015–1023. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2317309 
Rothwell, J., Bandar, Z., O’Shea, J., & McLean, D. (2006). Silent talker: A new computer-
based system for the analysis of facial cues to deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
20(6), 757–777. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1204 
Sánchez-Monedero, J., & Dencik, L. (2019). The datafication of the workplace (Data Justice 
Project, p. 48). Cardiff University. https://datajusticeproject.net/wp-
content/uploads/sites/30/2019/05/Report-The-datafication-of-the-workplace.pdf 
Saxe, L., & Ben-Shakhar, G. (1999). Admissibility of polygraph tests: The application of 
scientific standards post- Daubert. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 5(1), 203–223. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.5.1.203 
Simpson, J. R. (2008). Functional MRI lie detection: Too good to be true? The Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 36(4), 491–498. 
Strimbu, K., & Tavel, J. A. (2010). What are Biomarkers? Current Opinion in HIV and AIDS, 
5(6), 463–466. https://doi.org/10.1097/COH.0b013e32833ed177 
Ugail, H., Yap, M. H., & Rajoub, B. (2007). Face Reading Technology for Lie Detection. 
University of Bradford. School of Computing, Informatics, and Media. 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/seminars/archive/slides/2011-10-25.pdf 
Van Dijck, J. (2014). Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific 
paradigm and ideology. Surveillance & Society, 12(2), 197–208. 
Vrij, A., & Granhag, P. A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are the 
questions asked. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1(2), 110–
117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004 
Wilde, V. K. (2014). Neutral Competence? Polygraphy and Technology-Mediated 
Administrative Decisions. University of Virginia. 
Wilde, V. K. (2018). On lie detection. IBorderCtrl? No! https://iborderctrl.no/lie_detection 
Yan, W.-J., Li, X., Wang, S.-J., Zhao, G., Liu, Y.-J., Chen, Y.-H., & Fu, X. (2014). CASME 
II: An Improved Spontaneous Micro-Expression Database and the Baseline Evaluation. 
PLOS ONE, 9(1), e86041. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0086041 
Zhang, C., Bengio, S., Hardt, M., Recht, B., & Vinyals, O. (2016, November 10). 
Understanding deep learning requires rethinking generalization. ArXiv:1611.03530 
[Cs]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1611.03530 
Zhang, M., Fu, Q., Chen, Y.-H., & Fu, X. (2014). Emotional Context Influences Micro-
Expression Recognition. PLOS ONE, 9(4), e95018. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0095018 
 
